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ABSTRACT
A fixed block reward and voluntary transaction fees are two sources
of economic incentives for mining in Bitcoin and other cryptocur-
rencies. For Bitcoin, the block reward halves every 210,000 blocks
and it is supposed to vanish gradually. The remaining incentive
of transaction fees is optional and arbitrary, and an undercutting
attack [CCS 2016] becomes a potential threat, where the attacker
deliberately forks an existing chain by leaving wealthy transactions
unclaimed to attract other petty complaint miners to its fork. This
work defines a mining game played by undercutters, honest miners
and rational (instead of petty compliant) miners, and analyzes the
profitability of undercutting in a transaction fee-based system. Con-
trary to a more popular belief, we find that undercutting is not at all
profitable for most scenarios and when other miners are aware of
the presence of undercutting, their response strategies can further
shrink the undercutting profitability.
Our numerical simulations and experiments with the Bitcoin
data demonstrate that (i) only miners with mining power > 40%
have a reasonable probability of initiating a successful undercutting
attack. (ii) As honest miners do not shift to the fork immediately in
the first round, an undercutter’s profit drops with the number of
honest miners. Given the current transaction fee rate distribution in
Bitcoin, with half of the miners being honest, undercutting cannot
be profitable at all; With 25% honest mining power, an undercutter
with ≥ 45% mining power can expect income more than its "fair
share"; With no honest miners present, the threshold mining power
for a profitable undercutting is 42%. (iii) For the current largest
Bitcoin mining pool with 17.2% mining power, the probability of
successfully launching an undercutting attack is tiny and the ex-
pected returns are far below those from honest mining. (iv) While
the larger the prize the undercutter left unclaimed, the higher is the
probability of the attack succeeding but the attack’s profits indeed
goes down. Finally, we analyze the best responses to undercutting
for other rational miners. (v) For two rational miners and one of
them being the potential undercutter with 45% mining power, we
find the dominant strategy for the responding rational miner is to
stay honest or typical rational.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Bitcoin network [23] and several cryptocurrencies rely on
nodes participating in transaction verification, ordering and exe-
cution, and mining new blocks for their security and performance.
Bitcoin incentivizes these nodes (or miners) with block (mining)
rewards and transaction fees. Historically, the fixed block reward
has been the dominating source of Bitcoin miners’ revenues. How-
ever, the block reward is a system parameter for Bitcoin and halves
approximately every four years.1
With the deteriorating reward design choice, as the Bitcoin net-
work grows further, the block rewards domination is expected
to vanish and the transaction fees will become the major mining
revenue generator. Today, with a stable reward value, a miner’s
expected revenues rely mostly on the probability of it finding a
block, which itself is contingent on the miners hashing power. How-
ever, once the transaction fees start to dominate, the fair sharing
of revenue based on the hashing power may not be maintained:
transaction fees are voluntary and arbitrary, the total fee inside
different blocks can differ and the miner’s reward can no longer
be relatively fixed. As a simple, illustrative example, consider two
miners A and B in the system with 50% mining powers each such
that they both are expected to mine an almost equal number of
blocks. If minerAmines blocks with the total fee around 1 BTC each
and B always encounter wealthy transactions and mines blocks of
the total fee around 2 BTC each, B’s revenue is going to be twice of
A’s revenue. In general, under the transaction fee-based incentive
setting, a miner’s revenue mostly depends on users’ offerings and
its transaction selections. As both parameters are time-variant and
the timing of discovering new blocks matters, rational miners aim
for deviating mining strategies offering better rewards.
There have already been rigorous discussions on attacks re-
lated to mining strategies. Most notable attacks are selfish min-
ing [9, 24, 34], block withholding [7, 8, 18, 19, 28], and fork after
withholding [14]. Even the defenses against these game-theoretic
attacks have been well-studied [11, 15, 16, 26, 38]. Nevertheless,
the transaction fee-based incentivization framework brings about
new challenges: the freedom of choosing transactions to form new
blocks and the voluntary feature of fee rates nurtures a possible
deviating mining strategy called undercutting [6].
In undercutting, the attacker intentionally forks an existing chain
by leaving wealthier transactions out in its new block to attract
other (petty compliant) miners to join the fork. Petty compliant
miners break ties by selecting the chain that leaves out the most
transaction fees. Carlsten et al. find that undercutting can become
the equilibrium strategy for miners, thus making the system unsta-
ble as miners are undercutting each other. We observe that petty
compliant actions can be irrational especially when the attacker is
too weak or the edge in the amount of remaining fees of a chain
is small. If following the undercutter is unworthy, the assumed
petty compliant miners may not join the fork, thus making the
performance of undercutting questionable. Moreover, intuitively,
the undercutter risks losing what it could gain on the main chain
to start a fork. To compensate such risks, the attacker expects the
1The currently fixed block reward is 6.25 BTC. The next halving event to 3.125 BTC
is scheduled for May 2024. [10]
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Figure 1: Example Undercutting Attacks with Petty Compliant Followers [6] (top) and Rational Followers (bottom). In the two scenarios, we
have the main chain on the top and the forked chain on the bottom. The owner of each block is shown on the left bottom corner inside each
square, and the timestamp is on the bottom right corner. The miners that are working on extending each chain are on the top of each square
after the block is published. The arrows from/to different chains are presenting the chain switch of the miners when a new block is published.
The petty compliant miners act like honest miners but break ties by choosing the chain that has claimed the fewest transaction fees. Rational
miners can choose to extend each of the chains based on winning probabilities of chains. Trace 1 shows that all Petty compliant miners or
some Rational miner switch chains and work on extending the fork when Block B′i+1 is created. 2 shows that all Petty compliant miners or
some Rational miner switches back to the main chain when Bi+2 is published. When B
′
i+2 is published, all Petty compliant miners or some
Rational miner switches to the fork (shown by 3 ). When B′i+3 is published, all the Honest miners switch to the forked (shown by 4 ).
transaction fee rates in later transactions to be much lower than
its initially excluded wealthy transactions. Besides, the successful
implementation of undercutting discourages users from attaching
high fees to transactions, which harms fairness to users and lowers
average fee rates, narrowing the profit space for undercutting.
Towards analyzing the potential profitability of the undercutting
attack, we construct a model to capture the performance of under-
cutting. We accommodate miners who follow the undercutter to the
fork by incorporating rational miners, and also include honest min-
ers as players in the undercutting mining game. Overall, a rational
miner takes actions that will lead to the maximization of its returns:
it can selfishly pick transactions to form blocks, intentionally fork
the chain, or join a fork if worthwhile.
As illustrated in Figure 1, petty compliant miners mostly honest
mine as shown in trace 2 but select the chain with the most fees
available when faced with a tie as in trace 1 and 3. A rational miner
joins the fork with a certain probability if a new block is appended
to the fork as shown in trace 1 and 3. It can also shift back to the
previous chain when a new block is created as shown in trace 2.
Honest miners will only change sides when the other chain is longer
as shown in trace 4. The key here is to obtain the probability of a
rational miner shifting. In one sentence, we get this tendency by
calculating the probability of the other chain winning. Intuitively,
the higher this possibility, the more likely a rational miner joins
the fork. The undercutter can tune this possibility by choosing the
proportion of high fee rate transactions to leave outside. The more
it leaves out, the higher the possibility that other rational miners
joining will be and the faster its mining power will be diluted.
1.1 Contributions
A general framework for analyzing profitability issues of
miners’ deviating mining strategies analytically. By forcing
different system states and applying different transition functions,
we can analyze attacks or games related to miners’ behaviors other
than undercutting. For undercutting, we keep track of the heights of
competing chains and the mining power distribution among them.
State transitions are determined by event types – which chain ex-
tends by one block. System states update after transitions. In some
attacks like selfish mining, some elements like mining power distri-
bution in system states may stay unchanged after state transition.
We can accommodate this by altering the state transition function.
We can also utilize this model to analyze the profitability of under-
cutting on other PoW-based cryptocurrencies. System parameters
including the safe depth and fee rates distribution can be fed into
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the model at the outset. Besides, the model can also be of potential
value for systems relying on the stability of Bitcoin like [17, 21, 27]
where Bitcoin forks can cause rewinding of their system states.
Analytical results on the profitability of undercutting attack.
We abstract the Bitcoin system as states during the process of
mining. System evolution is characterized by state transitions. We
model the outcome of undercutting by accommodating the under-
cutter and other miners’ behaviors and the updating rules for state
transitions. The principal idea here is to model the decisions of
rational miners other than the attacker. They play a mixed strat-
egy to shift among chains with a certain probability, which is an
augmented probability of a chain winning. This probability is deter-
mined by treating the time needed for a chain to extend to a certain
length as an Erlang distribution. With the knowledge of system’s
initial state and the transitions, we can obtain all possible paths from
the initial state to a specific state and compute the undercutter’s
returns with specific fee rate distributions. Nevertheless, without
specifying these distributions, we can still deduce the conditions
that make undercutting profitable for the attacker and compare
it with empirical statistics. Against the general perception in the
cryptocurrency world, we find that undercutting is not profitable
in most cases and we summarize the results below:
(1) For the probability of successfully launching an undercutting
attack to exceed 1/2, the undercutter needs a rather large mining
power.We find the thresholdmining power to be close to 40%.While
this threshold varies for different target success probability, for the
current largest Bitcoin mining pool taking up around 17.2% of the
entire mining power[32], the probability to successfully initiate
undercutting is very small (0.95%-3.95%).
(2) For undercutting to be profitable( i.e., the expected returns
to be higher than the attacker’s fair share), the undercutter needs
more than 42% mining power to start in the best case, where the
best case assumes that there are no honest miners. When half of
the miners are honest, then the undercutting attack is not feasible
even for strong attackers with nearly 50% mining power. In general,
the presence of honest miners discourages strong undercutters.
(3) For an undercutting attack to be profitable, specific distribu-
tions of future transaction fee rates are necessary. For an under-
cutter with 40% mining power, the miner will be expecting later
transactions to be attached with much lower fee rates than the ones
he initially sets aside on the fork. As typically it is not feasible to
accurately predict the future, the attacker will be subject to volatile
fluctuations on his returns. Besides, the undercutting strategy is
sensitive to the changes in fee rates in subsequent transactions. If
later transactions are not significantly worse than the ones left out,
the extra profit the undercutter can obtain is limited. Indeed, the
current fee rate distributions discourage undercutting.
(4) The successful launch of this attack will violate the system
invariant that higher fee rates imply faster confirmation which we
later define in Section 3.1. If significantly high fee rate transactions
trigger a potential attack, users will no longer be motivated to do so.
This will change the distribution of fee rates, resulting in a less prof-
itable transaction space, thus making undercutting less profitable
over time. User reverse selection discourages undercutting.
Game-theoretical analysis of other rationalminers’ responses.
We model a mining game with three players, an initial undercutter
who has started an attack, a rational miner, and an honest miner.
Since honest miners do not strategize, we focus on the outcomes
of rational miner’s responses. We explore five strategies: staying
on the main chain, joining the fork immediately, honest mining,
being typical rational, and undercutting the undercutter. We run
the game for the three players and compute the profits for the ra-
tional miner. To locate equilibrium strategies, we closely looked
into payoff matrices for the undercutter and responding rational
miner with promising response strategies.
We observe that staying on the main chain stubbornly or joining
the fork immediately benefits the undercutter and the responding
rational miner earns less than its fair share. Staying honest or
rational will produce more profits than its fair share. Undercutting
the undercutter can make the attacker worse off but the responding
miner is losing much more. Undercutting is not an equilibrium
strategy and rational miners are in disadvantage by undercutting
each other. This is different from previous results. The best response
strategy for the responding rational miner in our setting is to stay
typical rational and do not undercut. One special case is when the
majority of miners in the system are honest, being honest is the
dominant strategy for all rational miners.
Experiments with Real-World Data. We test the model with
the Bitcoin transaction dataset from Dec 31st, 2019 to Feb 5th, 2020,
with 3.1 million transactions included. We simulate the decision
processes of miners according to our analytical model. The only
difference is that mining power distribution is now discrete. Min-
ers select a chain head they will extend and join with their full
computation power with some probability. We account for two
mining powers for the attacker, one is 17.2%, which represents the
real largest mining power at the time of writing, and the other is
45% which is a more ideal starting hashing power for the attacker.
The results show that in the current distribution of mining powers
in Bitcoin (i.e., the 17.2% attacker), the profits of the attacker are
decreased by over 80% (i.e., from 17.5% to less than 4%). Conversely,
if the attacker gains 45% of all the mining power in the network
the profits can increase by up to 13% (i.e., from 45.5% to 51%).
We further explore a variation of the undercutting attack dubbed
as the pruned attack, where the undercutter gives up on extending
its chain when the competing chain is a few blocks ahead. In our
experiments, we set this parameter to be 2 since if chain A is 2
blocks ahead, the probability of another chain B to catch up and
extend longer and faster is small. According to our results, for the
17.2% attacker, its profits approximately increase 7-8 percentage
points to 8%-12.5%. For the 45% attacker, the returns increase 1-4
percentage points to 48%.
2 RELATEDWORK AND COMPARISON
Carlsten et al. [6] introduce the undercutting mining strategy to
show the instability of the Bitcoin incentivization system without
fixed block rewards. The authors mainly consider three mining
strategies: default honest mining, undercutting, and petty compliant.
Here, undercutting miners will intentionally create forks, while
petty compliant miners break ties when there are multiple chains
by comparing the fees left unclaimed. They find that an equilibrium
exists where all undercutters use the same undercutting strategy.
In this work, we investigate the profitability of this mining strategy
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in detail and present an alternative view of the instability it might
bring about. Under our assumptions and without external utilities,
undercutting an existing undercutter puts the responding miner in
a disadvantageous position and benefits the initial attacker.
Similar to [6], we assume miners to be rational or honest. Ratio-
nal miners may undercut or join a fork when they think of it as
profitable. However, unlike petty compliant miners, rational min-
ers in our model choose chain heads based on the probability of
a chain becoming the main chain eventually and the fee prize left
unclaimed. In [6], players are aware of the strategies other miners
are using, while we limit miners to public information. They can
make inferences about other miners but only from a limited view-
point. In terms of return calculations, we allow the transaction fee
rates or the fee total inside blocks to change without specifying fee
rate distributions. We also deduce optimal fee total distributions for
the attack to be profitable and examine historical statistics to check
the frequency of such conditions appearing. Finally, Carlsten et al.
allow the undercutting miner to undercut the current chain head
and the previous block, while towards making the game setting
more relevant, we assume that the attacker can undercut blocks
not currently on-chain.2 Therefore, we observe much different re-
sults on the feasibility and profitability of undercutting and the
equilibrium strategies for rational miners.
Kiayias et al. [12] study stochastic mining games in the Bitcoin
system with fixed block reward. They define two games where
miners have complete information and they can be strategic in
new block publication or chain head selection. They find that the
best response for miners is to stay honest if each miner has small
computation power. When one miner has large computation power,
it can deviate from the default. Our analysis models the undercut-
ting game involving rational and honest miners dynamically in
the transaction fee-based setting. We allow rational miners to shift
among chains but state transitions depend on miners’ limited view
on system states. Miners do not have complete information. We
also find that strong miners can benefit from deviating.
Badertscher et al. [2] analyze the Bitcoin incentive mechanism
with the Rational Protocol Design framework. They find that the
expected revenue in combination with a high monetary value of
bitcoins can explain why Bitcoin is not being attacked in reality,
which means that rational assumptions on miners and bitcoin’s
high value can substitute the honest-majority assumption. With
this assumption, the equilibrium strategy for all rational miners in
the undercutting game is honest mining.
Intuitions from Economics - Risk Premium. In analogy to in-
vestment theory, in themining process, miners obtain their risk-free
rate of return by performing honest mining. When they intention-
ally undercut an existing chain, they are taking a risk of losing
their share that can be acquired from subsequent main chain blocks.
If the undercutter decides to take the risk, it is worthwhile if it
is earning a risk premium[4]. The income it can solidly get if the
attack is successful is the first block on the fork. If it stays on the
main chain and there is no fork, the probability of the next block
to appear is generally 1 and the probability of the chain to extend
further is 1. If it starts a fork, the probability of the first block to
occur is its mining power which is assumed to be less than 50%
2In Bitcoin, a block is considered on-chain after 6 confirmations.
and the probability of subsequent blocks to be mined on this fork
depends on the computation power accumulated. The transactions
the undercutter left outside have to be much wealthier compared
with transactions to come, to compensate for such risk.
LemonMarket. Another angle to look at the problem on a higher
level is through the market for "lemons"[1], the brand new car
that becomes defective the minute you bought it. In the Bitcoin
block space market, users are bidders, and miners are sellers. Users
will have ideal prices in mind based on their observation of the
relationship between confirmation time and fee rates. They then
attach corresponding fee rates based on their desired waiting time.
If a miner successfully launches an undercutting attack, users who
attach high fee rates but are ghosted are provided with "lemons"
instead of "peaches" – fast confirmation. If this happens more often
than rare, the average fee rates these users are willing to pay will
decrease and the overall fee rates tend to go down.
3 BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
3.1 Mempool
Mempool is an unconfirmed transaction set maintained by miners
locally. When a transaction is announced to the network, it enters
into miners’ mempools. A miner can also set up fee rate or size
thresholds to filter transactions. Miners select transactions from
their mempools to form new blocks. Usually, a miner will choose
the bandwidth set or near bandwidth set with respect to the local
mempool and global block size limit.When a new block is published,
miners verify the block and then update their local mempools to
exclude transactions included in the newly published block.
A miner can also intentionally select less wealthy transactions
to form blocks to attract rational miners. Wealthy transactions are
those with high fee rates. Here we have two measures for fee rates.
One is the fee per byte (F/B). As the name suggests, it is calculated
by dividing the total fee with the total size of a transaction. After
SegWit is introduced to the Bitcoin system, a new fee rate measure
fee per weight unit (F/WU) appears. For our analytical discussion,
we may refer to both terms simply as fee rates.
Undercutting is not desired because it violates the system invari-
ant we maintain:
Transactions attached with higher fee rates are selected
no later than transactions with lower fee rates, given that
they appear in the same mempool at the time the miner se-
lects transactions from mempool to form new blocks.
We desire this system invariant because if the invariant is not
kept, users are not incentivized to attach higher transaction fees
even if they would like their transactions confirmed faster. The
source of incentive is thus negatively affected. Moreover, if the
invariant is violated, miners are aware of possible unjustified block
formation procedure. Rational miners can make decisions to follow
the trend based on their observed information but honest miners
are put into a disadvantageous position, which violates the desired
honest behavior of Bitcoin mining specifications.
3.2 Definitions
In this section, we introduce definitions intensely used or important
in the context of later discussions.
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Definition 3.1. (Bandwidth Set.) Given block size limit B and
an unconfirmed transaction set A composed of N transactions, S
is one bandwidth set of A w.r.t B if S ∈ P(A) ∧ S .size ≤ B,∀Si ∈
P(A), Si .size ≤ B, S . f ee ≥ Si . f ee , where P(A) is the power set of A
and P(A) = {Si }1≤i≤2N .
Remark. If the unconfirmed transaction set is of size smaller or
equal to the block size limit B, then the bandwidth set is the memory
pool itself. If its size is greater than B, then the bandwidth set only
includes partial transactions from the pool. But bandwidth set is
not necessarily a unique dominant partition of the mempool. When
several different sets share the same fee total, they are all bandwidth
sets. If we sort transactions by their fee rates (amount of fee for
each byte), these bandwidth sets usually have similar components
with differences occurring on the lower end.
Definition 3.2. (Near Bandwidth Set.) A near bandwidth set S˜
is a collection of unconfirmed transactions, where a proportion of
p of the transactions are in the bandwidth set S .
Remark. When a miner forms a block, it balances the computation
of the puzzle and the inclusion of new transactions into the block
that it is constructing. It also needs to take into account the propaga-
tion speed of the new block which is pertinent to its size. Therefore
miners often have near bandwidth set in their new blocks. The
distance between a near bandwidth set and the bandwidth set can
be depicted as the ratio of transactions picked from the bandwidth
set to the size of it, which is close to B.
Definition 3.3. (Safe depth D.) A block is considered on-chain
after D confirmations.
Remark. For the current Bitcoin system, D = 6, which means that
a block is on-chain after 5 blocks have been appended to it. We do
not claim this block to be on main chain although it is when there
is only one chain in the system. When there exist multiple chains,
it is the first chain that succeeds to extend by 6 blocks from the
forking point becomes the main chain. It can still be forked but the
block that has reached safe depth is now on the main chain and all
transactions inside it are finalized. Note that there could be hard
forks that break this rule, but we limit the discussion to soft forks.
4 UNDERCUTTING MINING GAME
In this section, we model the system dynamically and explore the
profitability of undercutting strategies with various parameter sets.
We first define the game and the undercutting strategy. Then we
demonstrate how the system evolves with undercutting in presence.
We then compute the returns for the undercutter and compare it
with the profits it could obtain if there was no attack. We further
deduce the optimal conditions on transaction fee distributions in
subsequent blocks for the attack to be profitable.
4.1 Game Definition
We define the mining game G = ⟨M,A,R⟩ as follows:
(1) Players M = {α , β ,θ }: α denotes mining power of the un-
dercutter, β is honest mining power, and θ refers to mining power
of remaining rational miners. Honest miners are treated as one
because they follow the same mining rules. Flexible rational min-
ers can shift among chains. Rational miners are mostly flexible
except for the undercutter and that when we analyze best response
strategies for rational miners, they can be committed to certain
chains.
(2) Actions A = {mine, strateдy, chainID,publish}: mine indi-
cates whether to start mining; strateдy indicates which mining
algorithm the player chooses to use; chainID is the chain a player
chooses to extend;publish indicates whether to publish a new block.
The strateдy a miner chooses depends on its type.
(3) Utility functions R = {ui }i ∈M : the utility function is charac-
terized by the total transaction fees a player can obtain from the
game, which a rational miner intends to maximize.
We let an undercutter start attacking when it is not the owner
of the current chain head. We characterize the amount of high
fee rate transactions it left unclaimed from the current chain head
by a parameter γ . Suppose the prize size γ = 0.2 and the current
chain head incorporates 100 fee units (not realistic), an undercutter
typically leaves out the wealthy transactions worth 20 fee units and
puts remaining transactions in its new block.
We allow each miner to own no more than 50% mining power.
We let miners publish their discovered blocks immediately. We as-
sume there are sufficient transactions to be assembled into blocks
in the mempool. This assumption is reasonable since scalability
has been a bottleneck for the Bitcoin application. We assume the
mempool to be the same for miners on the same chain considering
that undercutting is not practical if miners have distinct mempools.
Because wealthy transactions an attacker left unclaimed may not
exist in others’ mempools in the first place. We allow the under-
cutter to set aside an arbitrary amount of transaction fees from its
bandwidth set transactions. These assumptions make the attacker
stronger and we intend to uncover what the attacker can obtain
with ideal environment settings. We also assume that new blocks
appear every 10 minutes, which is a goal of Bitcoin, regardless of
the chains they are appended to. This assumption is feasible in
the sense that currently difficulty is adjusted every 2016 blocks
for Bitcoin, we expect our game not to be happening in between
difficulty changes.
4.2 Stubborn Undercutting
In undercutting strategy, the deviatingminer forks an existing chain
by selecting only a limited proportion γ (γ ≤ 90%) of transactions
from its bandwidth set at time t . It can select other transactions
outside its bandwidth set. In the stubborn version of undercutting,
the undercutter does not give up on its chain until it wins or loses
the game. By winning we mean that a chain extends to safe depth
D from the forking point, which is the latest block all miners have
consensus on, before other chains. We set D = 6 for Bitcoin for now.
In the following discussions, we refer to the fork chain as "fork"
and the other chain as "main". The "main" might not be on the main
chain eventually. The relative height of a chain is the number of
blocks it has accumulated after the forking point.
Overall, the process proceeds as follows. The undercutter sees
a new block is appended to the main chain by some other miner.
It starts to work on a block that takes out wealthy transactions
appearing in the latest block. With some probability it can discover
this block faster than the next block on the main chain. When the
undercutter publishes its block, some rational miners will consider
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Figure 2: Stubborn Undercutting State Graph. Inside each circle,
(n,m) is the relative height of the fork and main chain after the
forking point. (0, 1) is the initial system state where a new block has
been appended to the main. The rightmost and bottom orange area
is the finish line. In a single step state transition, only one chainwill
increment its height by one. Every right arrow represents the fork
extending one block while each downward arrow representing the
main chain extended by one. The number on the top right of each
circle counts the number of distinct paths leading to this state.
shifting to the fork because there are more high fee rate transactions
that they can benefit from on the fork. To model this procedure, we
screenshot the state of the system as a tuple which we denote as
S = (m,n,R, F ,Θ,O,δ , λm , λn ), where:
• m is the relative height of the main chain and n is the relative
height of the fork after the forking point;
• R is the list of transaction fee total in blocks on the main chain
and F is a list of fee total inside blocks on the fork;
• Θ (Limited Power on the Fork) is the limited view of mining
power currently on the fork, which is the total mining power visible
on the fork. Intuitively, miners can see whatever is public and thus
form a point of view of the probability that the fork wins based on
the information they witness;
• O (Power on the Fork) is the actual mining power currently
working on the fork, which can increase or decrease based on new
block appending event. This quantity is not visible to miners;
• δ ∈ (−1, 1) is the mining power shifting from the main chain
to the fork, which is negative if miners are shifting to main chain;
• λm and λn are hypothetical block generation rates for the
main chain and fork respectively. The two rates reflect miners’
viewpoints and can be calculated form Θ in the parent state. They
are not the actual block incoming rates which can be derived form
O . We only include two limited view rates and disregard the actual
block occurrence rates in analytical analysis to save notations.
We model the full version single-undercutter game as a state
graph, as shown in Figure 2. Initially there is one chain in the system
and the undercutter intends to fork the main chain as shown by the
leftmost point (0,1). If the main chain extends one block, we go one
step downwards to (0,2). But if instead the undercutter successfully
mines a new block, then we go one step to the right to (1,1). The
undercutter wins if it reaches any vertices on the rightmost line.
We represent each state with only the relative height of two
chains in the graph because other elements in the state tuple will
be different after one-step transitions from different directions.
Following different paths to the same vertex, we can have distinct
system states. So how do we know what state we are in when we
are at a specific vertex? The answer is we do not know each element
if we stand at the node alone and have no knowledge about the
past. In the real world, we know the values ofm, n, R and F . But in
analytical analysis, we can only have assumptions and expectations
on the fee total R and F . For the other five elements, we need the
information about the path that is taken.
With the knowledge of the previous state, we first update the
value of Θ (visible mining power). If the block is published by a
miner already known to be on the chain, then it stays the same
as in the previous state. If the owner is "new" to the chain, then
miners update their viewpoints by adding this fresh proportion of
mining power to Θ. In analytical reasoning, we do not have this
information so we will be calculating the expected Θ. We discuss
the updating procedure in two scenarios. If the fork extends by one
block, then with some probability newly shifted mining power will
be visible. We denote the new mining power as δ as before and take
it for granted now and explain the derivation later. Then we have
Θi+1 =
Θ2i
Θi + δ
+ δ (1)
The intuition here is that with probability ΘiΘi+δ , a rational miner
only sees previously visible miners Θi . With probability δΘi+δ , the
miners shifted in the last round becomes visible, which is Θi + δ . If
instead, the main chain creates the next block, we update the limited
view of miners on the main chain first: Θi+1 = 1 − ( (1−Θi )
2
(1−Θi )−δ − δ ).
So how do we calculate δ for next round calculations? We obtain
this quantity with the probability of a chain winning and the actual
flexible miners on the other chain. We calculate the probability of a
chain winning (p)s through a black box that will be described in the
next section. With this probability p, we obtain δ by multiplying the
flexiblemining power on the other chainwith an augmented version
of p plus the honest miners if they are shifting. By augmented
version, we add an augmenting factor (ω), which is determined
by the proportion of transaction fees (γ ), to the raw calculation of
winning probability. We have this factor to account for the fact that
the more wealthy transactions the attacker leaves out, the more
attractive is the fork to rational miners. As described in Section
4.1, we denote undercutter mining power as α and honest mining
power as β . If the fork extends one block, then we have:
δ =

(1 −Oi − β) ·min(p · (1 + ω), 1) + β (a)
(1 −Oi − β) ·min(p · (1 + ω), 1) (b)
(1 −Oi ) ·min(p · (1 + ω), 1) (c)
(2)
where the conditions are (a) β is on main chain and the fork is now
longer; (b) β is on main chain but the fork is not longer; (c) β is on
the fork.
Likewise, if main chain miners extend by one block, we update
δ with respect to the winning probability of main chain.
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δ = −

(Oi − α − β) ·min(p · (1 − ω), 1) + β (d)
(Oi − α − β) ·min(p · (1 − ω), 1) (e)
(Oi − α) ·min(p · (1 − ω), 1) (f )
(3)
where the conditions are (d) β is on the fork and main chain is now
longer; (e) β is on the fork but the main chain is not longer; (f ) β
is on main chain.
In both cases, O will be updated as:
Oi+1 = Oi + δ (4)
For the augmenting factor ω, it depends on the risk preferences
for flexible rational miners. For more general discussions, we can
borrow the concept of risk-neutral, risk aversion, and risk-seeking
from prospect theory and apply corresponding augmenting factors.
Here we assume the rational miners are risk-neutral towards both
loss and gain. Then we have the following:
ωk =
∑k
i=1 Ri −
∑k
i=1 Fi∑k
i=1 Ri
(5)
where k ≤ 6 is the smaller depth of the two chains.
4.3 Probability of A Chain Winning
In this part, we describe one key drive of the system evolution when
undercutting is taking place, the probability of a chain winning,
which captures the probability of rational miners on one chain
shifting to another. To obtain the winning probability measure for
a chain from the state S , we first present necessary discussions
on the distribution of the time needed for a chain to complete D
confirmations and become solidly on-chain. We view the block
generation event as a Poisson process and use a random variable to
represent the waiting time between block occurrence events. We
denote the waiting time for the main chain as X and the fork as Y .
They both follow exponential distribution but with different rates.
The rate parameters depend on the mining power distribution.
Given a state S = (m,n,R, F ,Θ,O,δ , λm , λn ), we obtain the block
occurrence rate for this round as:
λm =
1 − Θ
10 ; λn =
Θ
10 (6)
This is derived based on the thinning theorem of the Poisson
point process. The main idea is that independent sub-processes
of a Poisson process are still Poisson processes with individual
rates. With this property, we can determine the time interval for
the next block to appear which follows exponential distribution.
More detailed proofs can be found in Appendix A.1. Here we use
the limited view mining power on fork for computation because
we are calculating the rates for rational miners to choose sides. We
are limited to the information visible to them. By substituting Θ
withO , we arrive at actual block generation rates. Next we proceed
and calculate the probability of the fork winning:
p = Pr {Fork W ins} = Pr {(D − n) · Y < (D −m) · X } (7)
We know (D − n) · Y ∼ Erlanд(D − n, λn ) and (D −m) · X ∼
Erlanд(D −m, λm ). Miners are aware of only public information.
We let miners use the current perceived mining power distribution
and obtain the cumulative joint distribution of the two random
variables below:
FX ,Y (x ,y) = Pr {X ≤ x ,Y ≤ y} = Pr {X ≤ x} · Pr {Y ≤ y}
= (1 −
D−m−1∑
k=0
1
k!e
−λm ·x · (λm · x)k )
· (1 −
D−n−1∑
k=0
1
k!e
−λn ·y · (λn · y)k )
We then obtain the probability density function:
fX ,Y (x ,y) =
∂2FX ,Y (x ,y)
∂x∂y
= Pm · Pn = Qm ·Qn
where Pm =
∑D−m−1
k=0
1
k !λ
k+1
m e
−λm ·x ·xk−∑D−m−1k=1 1(k−1)!e−λm ·x ·
λkm · xk−1) and Qm =
∑D−m−2
k=0
1
k ! · e−λm ·xλk+1m · xk .
Then the winning probability of a chain can be calculated by
p =
∫ ∞
0
∫ y
0
fX ,Y (x ,y)dxdy (8)
As the incoming block rates are calculated using the limited-view
of the mining power, here, p is capturing the conservative view
probability of the fork winning.
4.4 Return Analysis
In this section, we bring the transaction fee totals R and F contained
in blocks into the discussion. As shown in Figure 2, there are 210
paths in total where the undercutter reaches the right finish line
before the main chain miners reach the bottom finish line. Let E(F )
represent the expected revenue for the attacker after a game and
E(R) denote its expected income if there is no fork. We have:
E(F ) =
210∑
i=1
P{Path i is taken} ·
6∑
j=1
Fj · α
Oi, j
E(R) =
6∑
i=2
α · Ri
(9)
The probability of taking a specific path i can be obtained by mul-
tiplying the one-step transition probability along the path, which
equals to the actual mining power on the fork. In Equation 9, the
power on the fork at certain block O j is dependent upon the path
we are taking. Therefore we add path i to its subscript.
4.4.1 Numerical Simulations. We summarize simulation results,
the probability of the fork winning and the undercutter’s expected
returns, in Table 4 in Appendix. Overall, it is possible for a ratio-
nal miner to launch an attack and obtain extra profits out of it.
The winning probability and returns depend on the initial mining
power α , the mining power of honest miners β , and the prize size γ .
Following are important observations from the simulation results:
(1) Undercutter’s mining power α . : first of all, with larger start-
ing mining power, the chance of winning and the expected profits
both increase. Secondly, in the best case for the attacker, with zero
honest miners in the system and the prize size being high, the
threshold for the winning probability to be higher than 50% is 40%.
But the 40% attacker will not gain more than what its fair share
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based on the distribution of block fee total. With other distribu-
tions and timing, it is possible for the attacker to earn premiums.
Therefore we conservatively consider the threshold attacking min-
ing power to be 40%. Thirdly, for the attack to be profitable, the
threshold mining power is higher, which is 42% in the best case
with 0 honest miners. As honest miners increase, this threshold
mining power increases until undercutting becomes not profitable.
(2) Honest mining power β . : firstly, for stronger attackers, the
winning probability and the profits from attacking go downwards
if there are more honest miners in the system. Secondly, for weak
attackers, the higher the honest mining power, the better off the
undercutter can be, though still negligible. The intuition is that the
rational mining power they can attract is so small that by extending
the chain longer than the main chain and attracting the honest
miners will produce better profits.
(3) Prize size γ . : firstly, when the prize size increases, the probabil-
ity of the undercutter winning will be higher but in the meanwhile,
the attacking profits decrease. The attacker needs to make a trade-
off between the winning probability and the final returns it can
claim. The embedded reason is that When the attacker leaves more
transaction fee unclaimed, it can attract more rational miners to
the fork, which on the one hand increases the probability of the
fork becoming the main chain but on the other hand lessen the
proportion of the undercutter’s mining power on the fork. Secondly,
when there are more honest miners in the network, then the prize
proportion γ will have less effect on the winning probability and
eventual returns because there are less rational miners present.
4.4.2 Optimal Mempool Conditions for Undercutters. Next we
explore the conditions on the mempool to make a stubborn attack
profitable. For demonstration purposes, we reason with the initial
attacker having hashing power 17% and 45%, one accounting for the
current biggest mining pool and one standing for an advantageous
attacker. We can transform E(F ) in Equation 9 and rewrite the
expected returns of the undercutter as:
E(F ) =
6∑
j=1
210∑
i=1
α · Pr {Path i is taken}
Oi, j
· Fj (10)
where Oi, j is the mining power concentrated on the fork when
we take path i to get to the jth block on the fork. Finally we can
attain a tuple consisting of 6 elements, representing the expected
proportion of fees a miner can get from each block. We call this
tuple "return sequence".
For 17% scenario, the return sequence for parameter set α =
0.17, β = 0.0,γ = 0.9 is [0.0089, 0.0085, 0.0082, 0.0074, 0.0057,
0.0031]. Since R1 = (1 − γ ) · F1 = 0.1 · F1, we arrive at the expected
returns for the undercutter:
E(F 1) =0.0089 × 0.1 · R1 + 0.0085 · F2 + 0.0082 · F3
+ 0.0074 · F4 + 0.0057 · F5 + 0.0031 · F6
For the attack to be profitable, we need E(F 1) ≥ 0.17 ·∑6i=2 Ri .
To get an upper bound, we make coefficients in front of F2, ..., F6
equal to the smallest coefficient 0.0031. Then we let
0.0031 ·
6∑
i=2
Fi ≥ 0.17 ·
6∑
i=2
Ri − 0.0089 × 0.1 · R1
6∑
i=2
Fi ≥ 54.8387 ·
6∑
i=2
Ri − 0.2871 · R1
We obtained the upper bound for the coefficients of
∑6
i=2 Ri and
R1. We will refer to the two coefficients as the main coefficient and
residual coefficient. Similarly to obtain the lower bound for the
main coefficient, we can substitute coefficients of F2, ..., F6 with the
largest coefficient 0.0085. After computations, the main coefficient
range is [20, 54.8387], which is rare (did not happen) in hindsight
when we analyze historical data. The residual coefficient resides in
the range [0.1047, 0.2871].
For 45% scenario, the return sequence of the undercutter for
parameter set α = 0.45, β = 0.0,γ = 0.9 is [0.6918, 0.4634, 0.3940,
0.3553, 0.3309, 0.3169]. The attacker’s expected returns is
E(F 2) =0.6918 × 0.1 · R1 + 0.4634 · F2 + 0.3940 · F3
+ 0.3553 · F4 + 0.3309 · F5 + 0.3169 · F6
For the attack to be profitable, we need E(F 2) ≥ 0.45 ·∑6i=2 Ri .
Similarly to get an upper bound, we let
0.3169 ·
6∑
i=2
Fi ≥ 0.45 ·
6∑
i=2
Ri − 0.6918 × 0.1 · R1
6∑
i=2
Fi ≥ 1.42 ·
6∑
i=2
Ri − 0.2183 · R1
The main coefficient is in [0.9711, 1.42], which has a probability
of appearing around 70% of the time from 2018 to February 9, 2020.
The residual coefficient is in range [0.1493, 0.2183].
We summarize the lower and upper bounds for the coefficients
for different parameter sets in Figure 3. Note that the higher γ is,
the smaller will the second and fifth proportion number be. So
we compute the coefficient bounds with respect to γ = 0.9. This
will be the best case for the undercutter and the condition is least
demanding among other values of γ .
To determine whether the coefficient for
∑6
i=2 Ri is feasible, we
look into the empirical ratio between consecutive 5-block fee total
with 12243 blocks. We calculate this quantity to demonstrate the
typical relationship between the subsequent 5 blocks and preceding
5 blocks in terms of transaction fees contained. In history, 51% of
this ratio is between (0,1] and 48% is between (1,2]. We say the
empirical feasible range for the main coefficients is [0,2]. Then for
a given return sequence, a quick rule of thumb is to check whether
the upper bound of its main coefficient (mining power divided by
smallest element in return sequence) is in this range.
As shown in Figure 3, miners with more than 30% mining power
can expect to launch a profitable undercutting attack but with
demanding fee rate distribution. For miners with more than 39%
mining power, it can expect itself to successfully launch the attack
because its main coefficient upper bound with 0 honest miner in the
system is within [0,2]. Here the threshold is determined in terms
of possible profits and the underlying fee rate distribution is not
predefined. Our previous threshold 40% is decided in consideration
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Figure 3: Summary of Bounds on Two Coefficients with Different
Initial α . Here the main coefficient is the one for
∑6
i=2 Ri . The resid-
ual coefficient is for R1. The return sequence has six elements, in
decreasing order. We are only concerned with the 1st, 2nd, and last
element in the bounds calculation. For example, for the undercut-
ter with initial mining power being 45%, the 3 elements we care
about in the returns series are [0.6918, 0.4634, 0.3169]. The upper
bound for the main coefficient is 0.450.3169 = 1.42 and its lower bound
is 0.450.4634 = 0.9711 < 2. The upper bound for the residual coefficient
is 0.69180.3169 = 0.2183. Its lower bound is
0.6918
0.4634 = 0.1493. The summary
of the 3 elements in the return series for different undercutters is
provided in Table 5 in the Appendix.
of undercutting winning probability. The returns are calculated
with [1 − γ , 1 + γ , 1, 1, 1, 1] 6-block fee total distribution. A more
complete table for the coefficient bounds is organized in Table 5.
5 UNDERCUTTING THE UNDERCUTTER
Although it is demanding to start an undercutting attack and it is
not destined to be solidly profitable in each round because miners
cannot foresee the future. This does not guarantee that undercutting
will not happen, especially when there is some extreme occasion
or external utility insight. In this section, we mainly explore into
the question that if some rational miner is undercutting, what will
be the best response for other rational miners. In this section, we
are no longer concerned with the attacker’s profits only. On the
contrary, we try to maximize the utility of other rational miners.
We first describe (1) the responses other miners have towards an
undercutter. Then we look into (2) miners’ utility by taking certain
actions. We pay close attention to the situation of undercutting
as a response to undercutting, which means two undercutters are
present in the system.
5.1 Responses to Undercutting
We consider three aggregateminerswith one initial attackermattacker
who is rational, one honest minermhonest , and one rational miner
mavenдer who responds to the attack. The attacker is one party.
Honest miners act according to the specifications so they can be
viewed as one party. To derive a beast response for all other non-
undercutting rational miners, we consider them as one party and
explore different choices they have. For mavenдer , the response
strategy space we are considering is as follows:
Table 1: Summary of Profits for Response Strategies.
γ = 0.9, α = 0.45, β = 0.1
Profits Profit Proportional to (0.45 × 6)
rational 3.2762 54.60%
ϕ1 2.5172 41.95%
ϕ2 2.5819 43.03%
ϕ3 3.1195 51.99%
ϕ4 1.9702 32.84%
ϕ1 Stay on the main chain they are working on. This is worth
considering because shifting, updating mempools, and re-
computing the nonce brings about computation overhead.
ϕ2 Join the fork immediately. This is because the undercut-
ter has left high fee rate transactions outside. If a miner
is not originally the owner of blocks on the main chain
starting from the forking point, the miner can be better off
by shifting. This is petty compliant strategy in [6].
ϕ3 Honest mine. When there is a sufficient number of honest
miners in the system, it can be rational to follow the trend.
ϕ4 Undercut the undercutter.
In the previous analysis, we have found that miners with 45%
mining power can be expected to successfully undercut the main
chain. In the rest of our analysis, we set α = 0.45 and γ = 0.9. It is
subtle to choose the mining power formavenдer because this will
determine the mining power ofmhonest as well. For the nontrivial-
ity of discussion and the representativeness of the results, we test
formavenдer having 45% mining power and honest mining power
β = 0.1, to accommodate strategy ϕ4.
We summarize the profits for each response in Table 1. According
to simulation results, ϕ1 staying on the main and ϕ2 joining the fork
immediately benefits the undercutters. The profits ofmavenдer are
lower than their fair share. Staying typically rational produces the
most profits. Honest mining also generates higher expected profits
than fair share. The high level intrinsic reason for higher expected
income is that when there are competing chains in the system,
being honest or rational reserves the right to shift among chains.
By keeping options open, their expected returns can come from each
individual chain winning. ϕ4 undercutting the undercutter outputs
the least desired profits. This is because the initial undercutter is
already 1 block ahead at the start of the game and it does not change
sides. Besides, it is able to claim most of the blocks on its fork since
themavenдer does not shift either and there will only be limited
dilution of its mining power on its fork by honest miners.
5.2 Undercutting As A Response
Next, we look into the response strategyϕ4 undercutting. Intuitively
undercutting the attackermattacker brings about even less returns
formavenдer because the attacker is staying on the fork and the
only flexible mining power ismhonest . Given an attacker with α
mining power, the stronger themavenдer is, the smaller will the
honest miners be.
Initially, honestminers areworking on themain chain.mattacker
starts a fork through undercutting. The attacker leaves γ transac-
tion fees outside its first block. Thenmavenдer starts to work on
another fork. Next, if themattacker extends a new block,mhonest
shifts to its fork and this fork becomes the main chain because no
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miner is working on the main chain anymore. If the honest miner
extends the main chain by one block, then the system continues
evolving and no miner changes sides. Ifmavenдer appends a new
block, the other twominers will be aware of this fork. As the process
proceeds, only the honest miner will shift between chains. Once
mhonest shifts, the original main chain is discarded.
We simulate with mattacker and mavenдer both having 45%
mining power. From previous discussions, we know that they are
both capable of initiating a profitable undercutting attack. The re-
turns formattacker andmavenдer has been summarized in Table 2
and 3. In Table 2, we summarize the results formattacker undercuts
andmavenдer responses with honest mining or undercutting. If
the attacker initiates an undercutting attack, the dominant strategy
formavenдer is to be honest. Thus the equilibrium for (mattacker ,
mavenдer ) here is (Honest, Honest).
Table 2: Payoff Matrix for Response Space {ϕ3, ϕ4}. The rows rep-
resent choices of actions of mattacker while the columns are re-
sponses of mavenдer . Inside each cell, the first number is the re-
turns formattacker and the second number is represents the prof-
its for the initialmavenдer . There is a possibility thatmavenдer has
discovered thefirst block on the initialmain chain, it could earn 2.25
or 2.7 when they are both honest
Honest Undercutting
Honest (2.25, 2.25+) (3.1195, 1.9352)
Undercutting (1.9352, 3.1195) (3.4029, 1.9702)
Table 3: Payoff Matrix for Response Space {rational, ϕ4}
Rational Undercutting
Rational (2.25, 2.25+) (3.2762, 2.3031)
Undercutting (2.3031, 3.2762) (3.4029, 1.9702)
In Table 3, we summarize the results formattacker undercuts
and mavenдer responses with being honest or undercutting. If
the attacker initiates an undercutting attack, the best response for
mavenдer is to be typical rational. The equilibrium for (mattacker ,
mavenдer ) in this setting is (Undercutting/Rational, Rational). Here
if the undercutter can expect to earnmore than its fair share, then its
dominant strategy is to attack. We notice that the premium for the
initial undercutter is relatively small compared with the spreads of
mavenдer . The intuition here is that when an undercutter starts an
attack, other rational miners by shifting among chains can expect
to take advantage of the undercutter and honest miners. Combining
Table 2 and 3, we conclude that it is always preferred formavenдer
to stay rational. When there is an honest majority, the equilibrium
strategy for all rational miners is to honest mine.
6 SYSTEM EVALUATION ON BITCOIN
In this section, we evaluate the profitability of undercutting using
Bitcoin real-world data. We first prepare the set of transactions
used for the evaluation and further, explain the simulation setup of
the mining process and the results from the experiments.
Algorithm 1: Simulation Overview
input :txSet, minerSet, chainsTime
1 while txSet not empty do
2 extChain← nextChainToExtend(chainsTime);
3 m← selectNextBlockMiner(extChain);
4 nextBlock← publishBlock(m);
5 updateChains(extChain, nextBlock);
6 updateMiners(extChain);
7 updateMempool(extChain);
8 end
6.1 Data Collection
Transactions. We obtained the blocks 610, 691 (Dec 31st, 2019)
to 616, 726 (Feb 9th, 2020) from the Bitcoin blockchain using the
API provided by blockchain.com [31], from which we acquired
3, 168, 883 transactions. For each of these transactions, we extracted
the size, fee, and timestamp. The timestamp provided by blockchain.com
records the time the transaction was broadcasted to the network.
This timestamp will serve as a proxy for the time that the transac-
tion arrives at the miners’ mempool.
Miners. In this experiment, we consider three types of miners.
The undercutting miner also referred to as the adversary. We ex-
perimented with two types of undercutting miners (stubborn and
pruned) that only differ on their decision on when to give up on
an unsuccessful attack (i.e., return to the main chain and try to
fork it again). Next, we have the honest miners that follow the poli-
cies stated in the Bitcoin protocol, which is to extend the longest
chain and break ties according to the block’s broadcast time. Finally,
we have the rational miners that their goal is to maximize their
expected profits regardless of which chain is the longest.
To mimic the current state of the Bitcoin network, we follow the
mining power distribution ofminers published by blockchain.com [32]
on Feb 27th, 2020. In total, we have 17 miners, with mining pow-
ers ranging from 0.4 to 17.2 percent. To give the advantage to the
adversary, we select the strongest miner with 17.2% of the mining
power as the undercutting miner. The remaining 16 miners are
distributed between honest and rational miners as explained later.
6.2 Experiment Setup
In this part, we provide an overview of our simulation of the Bitcoin
blockchain. But before diving into the details, we will go over the
system assumptions. We consider the blockchain to be event-based,
where the events are new block creations. What this means is that
all the parameters of the system and miners (including the arrival
of the transactions) are updated upon the creation of a new block
which we denote as Bi for the remaining of this section. This is a
reasonable assumption for our work as we are only interested in the
block creations by the miners and their transaction fees. We further
assume that all the miners have the same view of the network and
there is no delay in propagation of the blocks and transactions.
Initial setup. We begin the simulation by first setting the time of
the system to the earliest timestamp (t0) of the collected transaction.
Next, we create the empty genesis block B0 and create the chainC0
by appending B0 to it. Next, we insert the tuple (C0, t0) to an empty
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Algorithm 2: Chain and Miner Updates
1 Function updateChains(extChain, nextBlock):
2 extChain.append(nextBlock);
3 foreach chain in chainsTime do
4 remove from chainsTime if it is non-wining
5 end
6 t← NextBlockCreationTime(extChain);
7 update chainsTime with tuple (extChain, t);
8 Function updateMiners(extChain):
9 foreach miner in minerSet do
10 if miner = undercutter then
11 decide to fork the new block;
12 if miner = honest then
13 if extChain longest chain then
14 switch to extChain;
15 if miner = rational then
16 calculate the winning probability and prize portion
(Section 4.3) and decide to switch to extChain or not;
17 end
list chainsTime. The tuples inside this list indicate when the next
block for each of the chains will be generated. Algo. 1 provides an
overview of the simulation after the initial setup. The simulation
takes the transactions (txSet), miners (minerSet) and the tuple
list (chainsTime) as input. We consider all inputs to be global for
all functions in the simulation. Each iteration of the while loop
indicates an event, that we further detail below.
Block creation (line 2-4 in Algo. 1). In the first step of each
iteration, the chain to be extended, extChain, is selected using the
nextChainToExtend function. It sorts all the tuples in chainsTime
and picks the chain with the smallest next block creation time.
Next, the algorithm selects the miner of the new block using the
selectNextBlockMiner function. This function randomly selects
miner m, from all theminers that areworking on extChain, weighted
by their mining power. Finally, the selected miner m publishes the
next block using the transactions in its mempool.
Chain updates (line 5 in Algo. 1). After the creation of the new
block Bi all the chains in the system are updated via the procedure
depicted in Algo. 2. In the first step, block Bi is appended to the cur-
rent extending chain extChain. Next, all other chains are checked
against the extChain to see if they are in a non-winning situation
(extChain has at least D blocks from the forking point). If a chain
is non-wining, it will be removed from the system and chainsTime
will be updated. Finally, the chainsTime list is updated with the
new time for the next block on extChain.
Miner updates (line 6 in Algo. 1). Following the chain updates,
miners update their working chain (i.e., the chain they are ex-
tending). Each miner based on its type (undercutter, honest, ratio-
nal) will decide if it should change its working chain (shown in
updateMiners function in Algo. 2).
(1) If extChain is a competing chain of a undercutter miner, the
miner will check to see if extChain is D blocks ahead of its
own chain (D depends on the type of adversary, stubborn or
pruned) and switch to extChain if it is.
(2) If extChain is not a forked chain of the undercutter, and miner
m (miner of block Bi ), is not the undercutting miner itself, it will
start to extend a new chain that forks block Bi by undercutting
miner m. Otherwise, it continues to extend extChain.
(3) All honest miners check to see if extChain is the longest chain
in the system. If so, they all switch to chain extChain.
(4) All rational miners that are not extending extChain, compare
the length of extChain with their current chain and calculate
the winning probability and prize amount of extChain accord-
ing to Section 4.3 and decide to switch to extChain or remain
on their current chain.
Mempool update (line 7 in Algo. 1). The last system update
before moving to the creation of the next block (Bi+1) is the mem-
pool update of miners. In this step, all the transactions in txSet
that have a timestamp between the creation time of Bi−1 and Bi
are added to the mempool of the miners working on extChain. In
such a manner, the transactions that arrive after time Bi will not
be included in block Bi+1.
Simulation run. We repeat all the steps explained above until all
the transactions have been included in the blocks (txSet is empty).
To remove the outliers rooted by the random selections (time and
miner selections), we repeat the experiment 10 times (for each set
of parameters explained below) and report the mean values.
The parameters that we consider in our simulation are threefold.
(1) Two types of undercutter miner, namely the stubborn and
pruned. The stubborn undercutter will give up on a forked
chain when the forked block is confirmed on the competing
chain (i.e., six blocks have been created since the fork point).
In contrast, the pruned undercutter will give up on the forked
chain as soon as the competing chain is two blocks ahead of
the forked chain (accepting an early defeat).
(2) The percentage of honest miners in the system. We considered
four variations with 0%, 25%, 50%, and 100% (no attack) of the
entire mining power.
(3) The prize portion that the undercutter leaves for other miners
when undercutting. We considered ten different values varying
from 0 to 1 with 0.1 steps. For example, the prize portion of
0.5 indicates that the undercutter leaves out the top valued
transactions that constitute 50% of all fees in the forking block
and replaces them with less valued transactions (if any).
Hypothetical Scenario. We also considered a hypothetical, but
a potentially realizable scenario where the undercutting attacker
has 45% of the entire mining power. To simulate this scenario, we
considered six other miners where five of them each had 10% of
the mining power and the remaining one had 5%. We repeated
the simulation with all the parameter combinations for this power
attacker and report the results in the next section.
6.3 Results
For an undercutter to make a fortune, it can either attract the honest
miners by extending the fork chain faster than the main chain or
attract the rational miners by leaving transactions with high fees
outside. We refer to the two effects as honest effect and rational
effect. The game between the undercutter and other miners will
have different outcomes depending on the attacker’s mining power
and the distribution of the mining power between the honset and
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Figure 4: Mean revenue of the undercutting miner with 17.2% min-
ing power (the highest mining power on Feb 27th, 2020) over 10 it-
erations (with 95% confidence intervals). The solid and dashed lines
show the profits of the stubborn and pruned attacker respectively.
flexible rational miners. We present the simulation results for the
undercutter’s profits in Figures 4 and 5.
Undercutting attack results in a loss in today’s Bitcoin net-
work. The solid lines in Figure 4 present the rewards of the attacker
under the stubborn case. We see that when there is no attack (all
miner play Honest), the miner with 17.2% power receives about
17.5% (the line with × marks) of all transaction fees as expected.
However, when the attacker undercuts other miners the profitabil-
ity drops significantly (to 1-4% of all the transaction fees). The
reason is that upon a fork, initially there will be only 17.2% mining
power on the forked chain. As a result, the probability of the forked
chain extending before the main chain will be low. Thus, the weak
undercutter cannot rely on the honest effect. Furthermore, as the
mining power on the forked chain is much lower than the 82.8%
power on the main chain, rational miners are less willing to change
chains (even in the case of same chain lengths) since they act ac-
cording to the probability of a chain winning. Therefore rational
effect will not be operative either.
The dashed lines in Figure 4 present the rewards of the attacker
under the pruned case. We see that the attacker is able to increase
its profit by about 9 percentage points. Although significant, it is
still 5 to 8 percentage points below the 17.5% baseline. The increase
is brought about by timely giving up of hopeless games. This shows
that in the current distribution of mining powers in Bitcoin, any
undercutting attack results in a decrease of profits.
Undercutting attack is profitable when the attacker has a
large amount of mining power. The solid lines in Figure 5
present the mean profits of the attacker under the stubborn case.
Similar to the previous case, when there is no attack, the miners
receive about the same share as their mining power. Here 45.5% for
the miner with 45% mining power (the line with × mark). Contrary
to the miner with 17.2% power, here, by undercutting the attacker
increases its profit by as much as 6% (when every other miner is
rational). However, for the case of 50% honest users, the profit of
the undercutter is slightly below the 45.5% baseline. The reason
is that the undercutting is only effecting the remaining 5% of the
rational miners and less attractive for the other (50%) honest miners
that follow the longest chain rule.
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Figure 5: Mean revenue of the undercutting miner with 45%mining
power over 10 iterations (to simplify the plot, the 95% confidence
intervals are not shown). The solid and dashed lines show the profits
of the stubborn and pruned attacker respectively.
The dashed lines in Figure 5 present the rewards of the attacker
under the pruned case. We see that depending on the percentage
of honest miners in the network the attacker’s profit increases,
decreases, or stays similar. When there are no honest miners, the
attacker is better off by being stubborn and keep the game alive
instead of killing it prematurely. However, when the majority of
miners (other than the attacker) are honest (i.e., the case of 50%
honest mining power), then there are only 5% flexible rational
miners the undercutter can try to attract. The attacker would gain
more by giving up a game when it’s not promising (3 percentage
point increase). In the scenario where there is 25% honest miners
and 30% flexible rational miners, by pruning, the undercutter can
either end the game early for honest miners or be stubborn to
attract more of the rational miners. Since the two group of miners
take up similar proportions of mining power, the expected returns
for the stubborn and pruned attacker will be similar.
The percentage of Honest miners has inverse effects on the
attacker with low and high mining powers. As shown in Fig-
ures 4 and 5 the presence of honest miners favors weak attackers.
The reason is that the winning chance of a weak attacker is negligi-
ble if the fork is only one or two blocks ahead, thus the tendency
of rational miners joining is low. The chance of the weak attacker
extending its fork longer than the main chain is greater than this
winning probability. Honest miners typically join longer chains.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we construct an analytical model for a mining game
involving undercutting strategy in Bitcoin. The game is defined in
the transaction fee-based incentivization mechanism. The potential
profitability of undercutting comes from the variance of fee rates
across time, which is eventually from the indefinite incoming of new
transactions. Therefore our major focus is put on the unconfirmed
transaction set, miners’ local mempools.
We explore the profitability of undercutting through numerical
simulations and experiments with real-world data. We find that
the attack is more likely to take effect with higher mining power.
Our detected threshold of hashing power for undercutting to be
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successful is 40% and 42% for it to be profitable given the current
transaction fee distributions in the best case with 0 honest miners
in the system. With the increase of honest mining power, both
thresholds increase. With majority honest miners, undercutting
is not profitable at all. For strong attackers capable of initiating
a profitable attack, their profits decline with more honest miners.
For weak attackers that are not expected to earn premiums from
undercutting, their returns are more decent with more honest min-
ers. Another factor that affects the performance of undercutting is
the prize size the attacker offers. When the prize portion reduces,
the probability of the attack succeeding goes down but undercut-
ter’s returns increase. This effect is more significant when honest
mining power is small. We also look into the best response to an
undercutting attack. The dominant strategy for a rational miner is
to stay rational and do not undercut again when faced with an un-
dercutting attack. When there is an honest majority in the system,
being honest is the equilibrium strategy for all rational miners.
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A PROOFS
Following problems and discussions are in the context of blockchains.
Some concepts may not apply to general contexts.
A.1 Derive Block Generation Rates for
Multiple Competing Chains
Problem Statement: Given the overall system block generation
being a Poisson process with rate λ, and c competing chains withmi
(
∑c
i=1mi = 1) mining power on each chain, the block generation
on an individual chain i is a Poisson process with ratemi · λ.
Sketch. This is essentially the thinning of a Poisson process.
We may as well refer to it as the thinning theorem. For proof
setup, we assume the system block generation rate λ is constant
and the puzzle complexity is adjusted in order to keep the average
block generation rate constant. The high level idea is to label each
event with the corresponding chain ID. The probability of a block
13
being appended to one chain is dependent upon the mining power
concentrated on this chain.
Proof. We assume the system block generation rate λ is con-
stant and the puzzle complexity is adjusted in order to keep the
average block generation rate constant. We assume mining power
distribution to be stable during the time period we are interested
in.
When i = 1,m1 = 1. The block generation rate on the single
chain is λ.
When i = 2, we have two competing chains in the system with
mining powerm1 andm2 = 1 −m1 (m1 ∈ (0, 1)). Since we assume
mining power distribution {m1,m2} to be stable and the consensus
protocol for Bitcoin is PoW, the two counting processes of blocks
appearing on each chain are independent. If we label each incoming
block with "1" or "2", depending on which chain it is appended to,
the probability of the next block being tagged "1" is m1 and the
probability of it being labelled "2" ism2. We record the two processes
as {N1(t)} and {N2(t)}. With Theorem A.1, we say {N1(t)}t ≥0 is a
Poisson process with ratem1λ and {N2(t)}t ≥0 is a Poisson process
with ratem2λ.
Theorem A.1. Suppose {N (t)}t ≥0 is a Poisson process with rate λ.
If an event can be independently observed with probability p and we
record this process as {N1(t)}, then {N1(t)}t ≥0 is a Poisson process
with rate λ1 = pλ.
When i > 2, there are i competing chains in the system. Similar
to the previous case, we can observe the event of a block being
appended to chain i with probability mi . We record this count-
ing process as {Ni (t)}. With Theorem A.1, we say {Ni (t)}t ≥0 is a
Poisson process with ratemiλ.
We briefly give the proof for Theorem A.1.
(1). N1(0) = p · N (0) = 0. The initial value for process N1(t) is
0.
(2). N1(t) ∼ Poisson(pλt).
P{N1(t) = k} =
∞∑
n=k
P{N1(t) = k |N (t) = n}P{N (t) = n}
=
∞∑
n=k
(
n
k
)
pk (1 − p)n−k (λt)
ne−λt
k!
=
pk (λt)ke−λt
k!
∞∑
n=k
((1 − p)λt)n−k
(n − k)!
=
pk (λt)ke−pλt
k!
□
B SIMULATION RESULTS
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Table 4: Stubborn Undercutting Simulation Summary with returns calculated based on "consistent" transaction fee rate distribution. We orga-
nized results for different honest mining power β , undercuttermining power α and prize proportion γ . Inside each cell, the three numbers are
respectively the profits, the profits expressed as a proportion of share, and the probability of the attacker winning. For the profits computation,
with different underlying fee rate distribution, we can compute different round returns. Here we assume a "consistent" fee rate distribution
such that each block on the main chain has the same fee total. WLOG, we can set this fee total as 1. For blocks on the fork, we treat the prize
γ as follows: γ is claimed uniformly in the subsequent D − 1 blocks. If we assume the prize can fit into each subsequent block, then 6 blocks
on the fork will have the following fee total tuple: [1 − γ , 1 + γ , 1, 1, 1, 1]. We compute the undercutter’s expected returns by multiplying the
tuple with expected return proportion series the attacker can get for all 6 blocks and sum them up. The rightmost column shows the expected
returns for the undercutter if it applies honest mining, based on the "consistent" transaction fee rate distribution. We intentionally left some
squares blank to highlight the marginal parameter sets for undercutting to outperform honest mining.
β=0
α
γ 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
0.35 1.2415 1.2471 1.2517 1.2552 1.2579 1.2596 1.2603 1.2603 1.2594 1.257724.83% 24.94% 25.03% 25.10% 25.16% 25.19% 25.21% 25.21% 25.19% 25.15%
35.08% 34.68% 34.27% 33.87% 33.46% 33.06% 32.66% 32.26% 31.88% 31.49%
0.36 1.3565 1.3639 1.3703 1.3755 1.3796 1.3827 1.3846 1.3856 1.3856 1.384627.13% 27.28% 27.41% 27.51% 27.59% 27.65% 27.69% 27.71% 27.71% 27.69%
38.68% 38.26% 37.83% 37.41% 36.98% 36.55% 36.12% 35.70% 35.28% 34.86%
0.37 1.4720 1.4817 1.4900 1.4971 1.5030 1.5076 1.5110 1.5133 1.5143 1.514329.44% 29.63% 29.80% 29.94% 30.06% 30.15% 30.22% 30.27% 30.29% 30.29%
42.30% 41.87% 41.44% 41.00% 40.55% 40.10% 39.65% 39.20% 38.76% 38.31%
0.38 1.5875 1.5994 1.6100 1.6193 1.6271 1.6335 1.6386 1.6424 1.6448 1.646031.75% 31.99% 32.20% 32.39% 32.54% 32.67% 32.77% 32.85% 32.90% 32.92%
45.93% 45.49% 45.05% 44.60% 44.15% 43.68% 43.22% 42.75% 42.28% 41.82%
0.39 1.7021 1.7166 1.7296 1.7411 1.7511 1.7596 1.7666 1.7721 1.7761 1.778634.04% 34.33% 34.59% 34.82% 35.02% 35.19% 35.33% 35.44% 35.52% 35.57%
49.52% 49.09% 48.65% 48.20% 47.74% 47.27% 46.79% 46.32% 45.83% 45.35%
0.4 1.8154 1.8324 1.8480 1.8619 1.8743 1.8850 1.8941 1.9015 1.9073 1.911536.31% 36.65% 36.96% 37.24% 37.49% 37.70% 37.88% 38.03% 38.15% 38.23%
53.05% 52.63% 52.19% 51.75% 51.29% 50.82% 50.35% 49.86% 49.37% 48.88%
0.41 1.9268 1.9465 1.9646 1.9811 1.9959 2.0090 2.0204 2.0300 2.0377 2.043738.54% 38.93% 39.29% 39.62% 39.92% 40.18% 40.41% 40.60% 40.75% 40.87%
56.50% 56.09% 55.67% 55.23% 54.79% 54.33% 53.85% 53.37% 52.88% 52.38%
0.42 2.0360 2.0584 2.0791 2.0982 2.1156 2.1312 2.1449 2.1567 2.1667 2.174740.72% 41.17% 41.58% 41.96% 42.31% 42.62% 42.90% 43.13% 43.33% 43.49%
59.85% 59.46% 59.05% 58.63% 58.20% 57.75% 57.28% 56.81% 56.32% 55.82%
0.43 2.1426 2.1676 2.1910 2.2128 2.2327 2.2508 2.2670 2.2812 2.2934 2.303642.85% 43.35% 43.82% 44.26% 44.65% 45.02% 45.34% 45.62% 45.87% 46.07%
63.09% 62.72% 62.33% 61.92% 61.50% 61.07% 60.62% 60.15% 59.68% 59.18%
0.44 2.2462 2.2740 2.3000 2.3244 2.3469 2.3676 2.3863 2.4030 2.4175 2.429944.92% 45.48% 46.00% 46.49% 46.94% 47.35% 47.73% 48.06% 48.35% 48.60%
66.21% 65.85% 65.48% 65.09% 64.69% 64.27% 63.84% 63.39% 62.93% 62.45%
0.45 2.3467 2.3771 2.4058 2.4328 2.4579 2.4812 2.5024 2.5215 2.5385 2.553246.93% 47.54% 48.12% 48.66% 49.16% 49.62% 50.05% 50.43% 50.77% 51.06%
69.18% 68.84% 68.49% 68.12% 67.74% 67.35% 66.94% 66.51% 66.06% 65.60%
0.46 2.4437 2.4768 2.5082 2.5378 2.5655 2.5912 2.6150 2.6366 2.6559 2.673048.87% 49.54% 50.16% 50.76% 51.31% 51.82% 52.30% 52.73% 53.12% 53.46%
74.68% 74.38% 74.07% 73.75% 73.41% 73.06% 72.69% 72.31% 71.90% 71.48%
0.47 2.5371 2.5729 2.6069 2.6390 2.6693 2.6976 2.7238 2.7478 2.7696 2.789050.74% 51.46% 52.14% 52.78% 53.39% 53.95% 54.48% 54.96% 55.39% 55.78%
74.68% 74.38% 74.07% 73.75% 73.41% 73.06% 72.69% 72.31% 71.90% 71.48%
0.48 2.6269 2.6653 2.7019 2.7365 2.7693 2.8000 2.8287 2.8552 2.8793 2.901152.54% 53.31% 54.04% 54.73% 55.39% 56.00% 56.57% 57.10% 57.59% 58.02%
77.18% 76.91% 76.62% 76.32% 76.01% 75.68% 75.34% 74.98% 74.60% 74.20%
0.49 2.7129 2.7539 2.7930 2.8302 2.8654 2.8986 2.9296 2.9584 2.9849 3.0089
15
54.26% 55.08% 55.86% 56.60% 57.31% 57.97% 58.59% 59.17% 59.70% 60.18%
79.51% 79.26% 79.00% 78.72% 78.44% 78.13% 77.82% 77.48% 77.13% 76.76%
0.5 2.7954 2.8388 2.8804 2.9200 2.9576 2.9931 3.0264 3.0575 3.0863 3.112555.91% 56.78% 57.61% 58.40% 59.15% 59.86% 60.53% 61.15% 61.73% 62.25%
81.67% 81.44% 81.21% 80.96% 80.70% 80.42% 80.13% 79.82% 79.50% 79.15%
β=0.25
α
γ 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
0.35 1.3710 1.3771 1.3826 1.3876 1.3922 1.3962 1.3996 1.4025 1.4050 1.406827.42% 27.54% 27.65% 27.75% 27.84% 27.92% 27.99% 28.05% 28.10% 28.14%
37.84% 37.68% 37.52% 37.36% 37.20% 37.04% 36.88% 36.72% 36.56% 36.40%
0.36 1.4721 1.4791 1.4855 1.4914 1.4967 1.2717 1.2735 1.2748 1.2755 1.275729.44% 29.58% 29.71% 29.83% 29.93% 25.43% 25.47% 25.50% 25.51% 25.51%
40.56% 40.39% 40.22% 40.05% 39.88% 33.09% 32.87% 32.66% 32.44% 32.22%
0.37 1.3561 1.3616 1.3665 1.3708 1.3744 1.3774 1.3797 1.3815 1.3826 1.383127.12% 27.23% 27.33% 27.42% 27.49% 27.55% 27.59% 27.63% 27.65% 27.66%
36.93% 36.69% 36.46% 36.22% 35.99% 35.75% 35.52% 35.29% 35.05% 34.82%
0.38 1.4602 1.4666 1.4724 1.4775 1.4818 1.4855 1.4885 1.4908 1.4924 1.493329.20% 29.33% 29.45% 29.55% 29.64% 29.71% 29.77% 29.82% 29.85% 29.87%
39.69% 39.45% 39.20% 38.95% 38.71% 38.46% 38.21% 37.96% 37.72% 37.47%
0.39 1.5658 1.5733 1.5800 1.5860 1.5912 1.5956 1.5993 1.6022 1.6044 1.605831.32% 31.47% 31.60% 31.72% 31.82% 31.91% 31.99% 32.04% 32.09% 32.12%
42.47% 42.22% 41.96% 41.71% 41.45% 41.19% 40.93% 40.67% 40.42% 40.16%
0.4 1.6727 1.6813 1.6890 1.6960 1.7021 1.7073 1.7118 1.7154 1.7182 1.720233.45% 33.63% 33.78% 33.92% 34.04% 34.15% 34.24% 34.31% 34.36% 34.40%
45.26% 45.00% 44.73% 44.47% 44.20% 43.94% 43.67% 43.40% 43.13% 42.86%
0.41 1.7804 1.7901 1.7990 1.8069 1.8140 1.8202 1.8254 1.8298 1.8333 1.835935.61% 35.80% 35.98% 36.14% 36.28% 36.40% 36.51% 36.60% 36.67% 36.72%
48.04% 47.77% 47.50% 47.23% 46.96% 46.68% 46.41% 46.13% 45.85% 45.58%
0.42 1.8885 1.8994 1.9094 1.9185 1.9266 1.9337 1.9398 1.9450 1.9493 1.952537.77% 37.99% 38.19% 38.37% 38.53% 38.67% 38.80% 38.90% 38.99% 39.05%
50.79% 50.52% 50.24% 49.97% 49.69% 49.41% 49.13% 48.85% 48.57% 48.28%
0.43 1.9967 2.0089 2.0201 2.0302 2.0394 2.0475 2.0546 2.0606 2.0657 2.069639.93% 40.18% 40.40% 40.60% 40.79% 40.95% 41.09% 41.21% 41.31% 41.39%
53.50% 53.23% 52.95% 52.68% 52.40% 52.11% 51.83% 51.54% 51.26% 50.97%
0.44 2.1047 2.1181 2.1305 2.1418 2.1520 2.1612 2.1693 2.1762 2.1821 2.186942.09% 42.36% 42.61% 42.84% 43.04% 43.22% 43.39% 43.52% 43.64% 43.74%
56.17% 55.89% 55.62% 55.34% 55.06% 54.78% 54.49% 54.20% 53.91% 53.62%
0.45 2.2122 2.2268 2.2404 2.2529 2.2642 2.2744 2.2835 2.2914 2.2982 2.303844.24% 44.54% 44.81% 45.06% 45.28% 45.49% 45.67% 45.83% 45.96% 46.08%
58.77% 58.50% 58.23% 57.95% 57.67% 57.39% 57.10% 56.81% 56.52% 56.23%
0.46 2.3188 2.3348 2.3496 2.3632 2.3757 2.3870 2.3970 2.4059 2.4136 2.420046.38% 46.70% 46.99% 47.26% 47.51% 47.74% 47.94% 48.12% 48.27% 48.40%
63.76% 63.49% 63.23% 62.96% 62.69% 62.41% 62.13% 61.84% 61.56% 61.27%
0.47 2.4245 2.4417 2.4577 2.4725 2.4860 2.4984 2.5095 2.5193 2.5279 2.535248.49% 48.83% 49.15% 49.45% 49.72% 49.97% 50.19% 50.39% 50.56% 50.70%
63.76% 63.49% 63.23% 62.96% 62.69% 62.41% 62.13% 61.84% 61.56% 61.27%
0.48 2.5289 2.5473 2.5645 2.5804 2.5951 2.6085 2.6207 2.6315 2.6409 2.649150.58% 50.95% 51.29% 51.61% 51.90% 52.17% 52.41% 52.63% 52.82% 52.98%
66.12% 65.87% 65.61% 65.34% 65.08% 64.80% 64.53% 64.25% 63.97% 63.68%
0.49 2.6320 2.6516 2.6699 2.6870 2.7027 2.7172 2.7303 2.7420 2.7524 2.761452.64% 53.03% 53.40% 53.74% 54.05% 54.34% 54.61% 54.84% 55.05% 55.23%
68.40% 68.15% 67.90% 67.64% 67.38% 67.11% 66.84% 66.57% 66.29% 66.01%
0.5 2.7337 2.7544 2.7738 2.7919 2.8086 2.8241 2.8381 2.8508 2.8621 2.8719
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54.67% 55.09% 55.48% 55.84% 56.17% 56.48% 56.76% 57.02% 57.24% 57.44%
70.57% 70.33% 70.09% 69.84% 69.59% 69.33% 69.07% 68.80% 68.53% 68.26%
β=0.5
α
γ 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
0.35 1.0555 1.0570 1.0583 1.0595 1.0604 1.0612 1.0618 1.0622 1.0624 1.062421.11% 21.14% 21.17% 21.19% 21.21% 21.22% 21.24% 21.24% 21.25% 21.25%
27.42% 27.35% 27.28% 27.20% 27.13% 27.06% 26.98% 26.91% 26.84% 26.76%
0.36 1.1399 1.1415 1.1430 1.1443 1.1454 1.1462 1.1469 1.1474 1.1476 1.147722.80% 22.83% 22.86% 22.89% 22.91% 22.92% 22.94% 22.95% 22.95% 22.95%
29.34% 29.27% 29.19% 29.11% 29.04% 28.96% 28.88% 28.81% 28.73% 28.66%
0.37 1.2269 1.2287 1.2303 1.2317 1.2329 1.2338 1.2346 1.2352 1.2355 1.235724.54% 24.57% 24.61% 24.63% 24.66% 24.68% 24.69% 24.70% 24.71% 24.71%
31.28% 31.20% 31.13% 31.05% 30.97% 30.89% 30.81% 30.74% 30.66% 30.58%
0.38 1.3163 1.3182 1.3199 1.3215 1.3228 1.3238 1.3247 1.3253 1.3258 1.326026.33% 26.36% 26.40% 26.43% 26.46% 26.48% 26.49% 26.51% 26.52% 26.52%
33.24% 33.16% 33.08% 33.00% 32.92% 32.84% 32.76% 32.68% 32.60% 32.53%
0.39 1.4078 1.4099 1.4117 1.4134 1.4148 1.4159 1.4169 1.4176 1.4181 1.418428.16% 28.20% 28.23% 28.27% 28.30% 28.32% 28.34% 28.35% 28.36% 28.37%
35.20% 35.12% 35.04% 34.96% 34.88% 34.80% 34.73% 34.65% 34.57% 34.49%
0.4 1.5014 1.5035 1.5055 1.5072 1.5087 1.5099 1.5110 1.5118 1.5123 1.512730.03% 30.07% 30.11% 30.14% 30.17% 30.20% 30.22% 30.24% 30.25% 30.25%
37.16% 37.08% 37.01% 36.93% 36.85% 36.77% 36.69% 36.61% 36.53% 36.45%
0.41 1.5967 1.5989 1.6009 1.6027 1.6042 1.6055 1.6066 1.6075 1.6081 1.608531.93% 31.98% 32.02% 32.05% 32.08% 32.11% 32.13% 32.15% 32.16% 32.17%
39.11% 39.04% 38.96% 38.88% 38.81% 38.73% 38.65% 38.58% 38.50% 38.42%
0.42 1.6935 1.6957 1.6978 1.6996 1.7012 1.7025 1.7037 1.7046 1.7053 1.705733.87% 33.91% 33.96% 33.99% 34.02% 34.05% 34.07% 34.09% 34.11% 34.11%
41.04% 40.97% 40.90% 40.82% 40.75% 40.68% 40.60% 40.53% 40.45% 40.38%
0.43 1.7916 1.7938 1.7959 1.7977 1.7993 1.8006 1.8018 1.8027 1.8035 1.804035.83% 35.88% 35.92% 35.95% 35.99% 36.01% 36.04% 36.05% 36.07% 36.08%
42.95% 42.88% 42.81% 42.74% 42.67% 42.60% 42.53% 42.46% 42.39% 42.32%
0.44 1.8909 1.8930 1.8950 1.8968 1.8983 1.8997 1.9008 1.9017 1.9025 1.903037.82% 37.86% 37.90% 37.94% 37.97% 37.99% 38.02% 38.03% 38.05% 38.06%
44.81% 44.75% 44.69% 44.62% 44.56% 44.50% 44.43% 44.37% 44.30% 44.24%
0.45 1.9910 1.9931 1.9949 1.9966 1.9980 1.9993 2.0004 2.0013 2.0020 2.002539.82% 39.86% 39.90% 39.93% 39.96% 39.99% 40.01% 40.03% 40.04% 40.05%
46.64% 46.58% 46.53% 46.47% 46.41% 46.36% 46.30% 46.24% 46.18% 46.13%
0.46 2.0920 2.0938 2.0954 2.0969 2.0983 2.0994 2.1004 2.1012 2.1019 2.102441.84% 41.88% 41.91% 41.94% 41.97% 41.99% 42.01% 42.02% 42.04% 42.05%
48.41% 48.36% 48.32% 48.27% 48.22% 48.17% 48.12% 48.07% 48.03% 47.98%
0.47 2.1935 2.1950 2.1964 2.1976 2.1987 2.1997 2.2006 2.2013 2.2018 2.202343.87% 43.90% 43.93% 43.95% 43.97% 43.99% 44.01% 44.03% 44.04% 44.05%
50.13% 50.09% 50.05% 50.02% 49.98% 49.94% 49.90% 49.86% 49.82% 49.78%
0.48 2.2954 2.2966 2.2976 2.2985 2.2993 2.3000 2.3007 2.3012 2.3016 2.302045.91% 45.93% 45.95% 45.97% 45.99% 46.00% 46.01% 46.02% 46.03% 46.04%
51.79% 51.76% 51.73% 51.70% 51.68% 51.65% 51.62% 51.59% 51.57% 51.54%
0.49 2.3976 2.3983 2.3988 2.3993 2.3998 2.4002 2.4006 2.4008 2.4011 2.401347.95% 47.97% 47.98% 47.99% 48.00% 48.00% 48.01% 48.02% 48.02% 48.03%
53.37% 53.36% 53.34% 53.33% 53.31% 53.30% 53.28% 53.27% 53.26% 53.24%
0.5 2.5000 2.5000 2.5000 2.5000 2.5000 2.5000 2.5000 2.5000 2.5000 2.500050.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
54.88% 54.88% 54.88% 54.88% 54.88% 54.88% 54.88% 54.88% 54.88% 54.88%
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Table 5: Summary of Bounds on Two Coefficients with Different Initial α .
γ = 0.9
α 1st 2nd 6th Main Coefficient Residual Coefficient
0.17 0.0089 0.0085 0.0031 [20.0000, 54.8387] [0.1047, 0.2871]
0.20 0.0225 0.0210 0.0076 [9.5147, 26.3158] [0.1068, 0.2954]
0.25 0.0763 0.0672 0.0254 [3.7181, 9.8464] [0.1134, 0.3003]
0.30 0.1875 0.1539 0.0649 [1.9490, 4.6197] [0.1218, 0.2887]
0.35 0.3508 0.2682 0.1319 [1.3050, 2.6535] [0.1308, 0.2660]
0.36 0.3868 0.2916 0.1482 [1.2346, 2.4291] [ 0.1326, 0.2610]
0.37 0.423 0.3146 0.1652 [1.1761, 2.2397] [ 0.1345, 0.2561]
0.38 0.4593 0.337 0.183 [1.1276 2.0765] [0.1363, 0.2510]
0.39 0.4952 0.3586 0.2012 [1.0876, 1.9384] [ 0.1381, 0.2461]
0.40 0.5305 0.3791 0.2199 [1.0551, 1.8190] [ 0.1399, 0.2412]
0.41 0.565 0.3985 0.239 [1.0289, 1.7155] [ 0.1418, 0.2364]
0.42 0.5985 0.4167 0.2583 [1.0079, 1.6260] [ 0.1436, 0.2317]
0.43 0.6309 0.4336 0.2778 [0.9917, 1.5479] [ 0.1455, 0.2271]
0.44 0.6621 0.4491 0.2973 [0.9797, 1.4800] [ 0.1474, 0.2227]
0.45 0.6918 0.4634 0.3169 [0.9711, 1.4200] [ 0.1493, 0.2183]
0.46 0.7201 0.4763 0.3363 [0.9658, 1.3678] [ 0.1512, 0.2141]
0.47 0.7468 0.4879 0.3556 [0.9633, 1.3217] [ 0.1531, 0.2100]
0.48 0.7718 0.4982 0.3746 [0.9635, 1.2814] [ 0.1549, 0.2060]
0.49 0.7951 0.5074 0.3933 [0.9657, 1.2459] [ 0.1567, 0.2022]
0.50 0.8167 0.5155 0.4117 [0.9699, 1.2145]] [ 0.1584 0.1984]
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